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The Dismantling of Family Farming
Policies in Brazil and Argentina
Eric Sabourin, Clara Craviotti and Carolina Milhorance
 
Introduction
1 The first decade of the 21st century was marked by the consolidation of specific family
farming policies in several Latin American countries. These policies combine a set of
policy instruments targeted at a specific segment of farmers, those whose production
units are associated with five characteristics/criteria: limited area; predominance of
family labor; family management; gross income primarily from agricultural production;
and  residence  on  or  near  the  farm  (Sabourin,  Samper,  Sotomayor,  2015).  Family
farming-specific  policies  generally  include  three  types  of  instruments  (e.g.,  credit,
technical assistance and organizational support), forming policy portfolios (Howlett &
del Rio, 2015).
2 The development of these policies in Latin America resulted from coalitions involving
social  movements and public  actors,  which benefited from the election of  left-wing
governments and seized windows of opportunity favorable to family farming groups
(Sabourin, Samper, & Sotomayor, 2015). However, since the early 2010s, these coalitions
have  lost  space,  resources,  political  weight  and  legitimacy,  which  has  led  to  a
progressive (and sometimes radical) dismantling of family farming policy instruments
(Mattei, 2018, Nierdele et al., 2019; Nogueira, Urcola, & Lattuada, 2017). While public
policy studies have commonly addressed the assessment and explanation of different
degrees of policy change, less attention was paid to the directions of change. Policy
dismantling refers to a specific direction of change in which the patterns of “decrease”
(or even reversal) of existing policy arrangements are taken into account. Comparative
studies of this process have shown that the politics of dismantling varies significantly
across different policy fields (Bauer & Knill, 2012).
3 This article examines the processes of dismantling public policies oriented to promote
or regulate family farming in Latin America. It addresses two main questions: How and
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why  were  these  policies  dismantled?  Drawing  on  Bauer  et  al.’s  (2012)  analytical
framework,  the  article  examines  the  modalities  and  stages  of  the  process  of
dismantling these policy instruments in Brazil and Argentina. Likewise, it discusses the
causes of this process by delving into structural, contextual and institutional factors. It
adds to the current literature by adapting the framework to a policy field and region
that  has  received  hardly  any  attention  and  by  further  elaborating  the  causes  and
processes of dismantling. It also provides insights into the resilience of these policies
and  into  the  mechanisms  of  resistance  to  short-term  political  pressures  and
governmental shifts.
4 This  article  argues  that,  in  both  countries,  family  farming  policies  carry  a  specific
meaning related to  struggles  and agreements  with historically  dominant  coalitions,
which impacts on perceptions of the costs and benefits of dismantling. Moreover, both
Brazil  and Argentina face challenges in terms of  institutional  fragmentation,  which
restrains their systems of checks and balances in the assuring of basic rights, enabling
power imbalance towards the executive branch of the government. Finally, it stresses
that  dismantling  starts  with  discreet  strategies  before  it  reaches  more  active  and
disclosed forms. Brazil and Argentina were chosen as case studies as the agricultural
sector  has  major  importance  in  both  countries'  economies  and  politics  and  family
farming groups are predominant in the agrarian structure of both countries, acquiring
major political resources over the past decade, thereby reversing a previous situation
of marginalization. 
5 The first section presents the analytical framework of the study. The second section
identifies policy instruments that have targeted family farms across Latin America and
have led to their consolidation over time. The third section discusses the modalities
and  causes  of  policy  dismantling  in  Brazil  and  Argentina.  And,  finally,  the  fourth
section provides some potential  responses to change and a possible future research
agenda.
 
1. Analytical framework for policy dismantling
1.1. Theoretical background
6 Despite increasing accounts of policy dismantling and rupture processes, these issues
have not been systematically addressed by policy research (Jordan, Bauer, & Green-
Pedersen,  2013).  Indeed,  welfare-state  retrenchment  and  the  weakening  of  social
policies  have  been  addressed  by  institutionalist  scholars  (Pierson,  1994).  Likewise,
notions of rupture and critical moments have been mobilized by the neo-institutional
economy,  arguing  the  path  dependence  of  policies  (Mahoney,  2001).  Finally,
Rosanvallon  (2014)  and  Levitsky  and  Ziblatt  (2018)  analyzed  the  regression  of
democracy and the generalization of neoliberal policies and new capitalist evolutions
in Europe and the United States.
7 On the other hand, Howlett (2019) discusses means for improving the resilience and
robustness of policies over time or, in other words, mechanisms for preventing policy
dismantling. Resilience is the ability to adapt to major internal/external perturbations,
while robustness refers to the ability to maintain the same performance in the face of a
variety of contexts. According to Howlett,  achieving both requires duplicating some
resources and adding procedural policy tools (for monitoring and revising policies) in
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order to deal with unforeseen events and to “patch” policies over time. Nevertheless,
while it is plausible that more institutional constraints and “lock-in” tools generally
reduce chances for direct dismantling (and vice versa), this does not mean that, in such
contexts,  policy dismantling is  not feasible (Jordan et  al.,  2013).  The resilience of  a
given policy is therefore an important issue to analyze in the context of governmental
shifts.
8 Rather than focus on the occurrence or non-occurrence of dismantling, it is crucial to
analyze how, and to what extent, dismantling processes occur. However, most of these
studies fail both to identify empirically the main causes and patterns of change and to
provide  an  analytical  framework  for  policy  dismantling  and  comparative  analyses
(Jordan et al., 2013). Bauer, Jordan, Green-Pedersen and Héritier (2012) address this gap
by  developing  a  comprehensive  framework  for  analyzing  policy  dismantling
mechanisms,  causes and outputs.  Policy dismantling is  thought of  as  a  direction of
policy change, implying the “reduction”, “decrease”, “diminution” — even reversal —
of existing policy arrangements. These authors are concerned with two specific and
interrelated sets of questions: first, under which conditions do political actors engage
in  policy  dismantling?  And  second,  given  other  actors’  preferences,  institutional
constraints and opportunities, and specific situational factors, which strategies do they
choose? Both questions are relevant to the case studies presented in this article and
both provide analytical elements for answering the question of why and how family
farming policies in Brazil and Argentina have been recently dismantled. These will be
further developed below.
 
Structural, institutional and situational factors
9 The factors leading to policy change through dismantling may be separated into three
different types: i) external factors and prevailing macro conditions, such as the stability
of the financial system, technological change, the spread of certain ideas of reform and
unforeseen elections; ii) situational factors, which are primarily background issues; and
iii)  institutional  constraints  and  opportunities,  particularly  those  related  to
opportunity  structures  comprising  the  features  of the  political  system (the  polity).
Depending on the specific combination of factors affecting the preferences of political
actors  and their  capability  to  pursue policy  dismantling,  distinct  strategies  may be
chosen (Bauer et al. 2012). 
10 The first set of factors refers to socio-political or economic changes or events, including
but not limited to major economic shocks, supranational policy pressure, governmental
shift and change in policy paradigms. These factors are characterized by the fact that
they are beyond the direct influence of policy actors and can shift the balance of power
within the policy field, thereby supporting or undermining policy dismantling (Gürtler
et al., 2019). The second group mainly relates to the political economy of the specific
policy field, including the structural features of the sector, the configuration of actors
and their interests and political power. According to Gürtler et al (2019), these factors
also include the specific patterns of policy design, which shape the distribution of costs
and benefits across those affected by a policy. Regarding the design of policy portfolios,
the notion of resilience may add to the analytical framework. The notion refers to the
ability to deal with opposition and conflict that may emerge over the medium-to-long
term (Howlett,  2019).  The design of “lock-in” tools that can reduce the changes for
direct dismantling is considered here.
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11 This  point  aligns  with  the  third  set  of  factors,  which  refers  to  the  institutional
constraints  specific  to  each  political  system.  According  to  Bauer  et  al.  2012,  the
electoral  system,  the  party  system  and  the  strength  of  veto  players  (such  as
constitutional  courts),  among  other  factors,  affect  if,  and  to  what extent,  the
government expects to be able to realize its dismantling objectives. Moreover, actors’
perceptions  of  dismantling  may  be  affected  by  election  cycles  and  by  the  partisan
positions of policymakers, which are ultimately related to the varying composition of
governments and legislatures. An additional explanation for policy dismantling is the
possibility of shifting the blame to subnational, supranational, or international actors
and structures.  Finally,  the main factor refers to the extent to which the costs and
benefits of dismantling are perceived to be dispersed or concentrated across affected
actors. This perception is influenced by the policy features and the organizational and
institutional structures characterizing the political system.
12 According  to  these  arguments,  dismantling  policies  that  are  perceived  to  have
concentrated  costs  and  diffused  benefits  (such  as  environmental  policies)  may  be
rewarding for some political actors, depending on the strength of the interest groups
bearing the costs (for instance, well-organized economic groups opposed to
environmental  regulation  groups).  Meanwhile,  interventions  perceived  to  have
diffused costs and concentrated benefits, such as social policies, are commonly led by
politicians’  blame-avoidance.  This pattern is  aligned with much of the welfare-state
retrenchment  literature;  for  instance,  in  the  context  of  economic  austerity,  when
politicians are “forced” to withdraw public funds from vulnerable beneficiaries. Note
that these costs and benefits distributions reflect political actors’ perceptions and are
not an objective indicator. 
13 Family farming policies comprise instruments of social participation and protection,
productive  inclusion  and  protection  of  minorities  and  are  therefore  theoretically
comparable to the social policies type. However, as discussed in Sections 2 and 3, the
distribution of the costs and benefits of dismantling is not straightforward in this case.
 
Dismantling processes
14 Regarding policy-dismantling stages and modalities, Bauer et al.  (2012) identify four
main approaches that differ according to the extent to which the process is consciously
undertaken, as well as the extent to which political actors wish to hide or reveal their
activities. First, dismantling by default relies on de facto retrenchment through budget
allocations  with  low  visibility  and  the  absence  of  any  decision  attracting  political
attention. Second, dismantling by arena shifting refers to an actual decision to move a
policy to a different arena such as another government level (i.e.,  decentralization),
weak agencies, or another sector where the policy may receive lower priority. Water
privatization in Europe would be an example of exempting public authorities from the
responsibility of implementation.
15 Third, dismantling by symbolic action consists of ensuring that any dismantling intention
is clearly and directly attributed to political decision-makers as it may be important to
many actors;  therefore, political declarations do not necessarily lead to outputs but
remain  symbolic.  This  type  of  strategy  may  be  the  result  of  high  institutional
constraints, or of the heterogeneity of political actors’ preferences. Finally, the most
apparent  strategy  is  active  dismantling,  which  displays  high  visibility  with  a  strong
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preference  to  dismantle.  In  this  case,  dismantling  might  be  rewarding  for  political
actors as a result  of  incisive demands or ideological  positions.  This movement may
entail dismantling in one area along with expansion in others.
16 The theoretical  framework presented above  was  predominantly  applied  to  cases  in
Europe and the United States. The present study draws on this framework; however, it
provides an original example by turning to Latin America. It highlights some of the
particularities  of  these  countries,  namely  the  politicization  of  rural  social  (and
productive  inclusion)  policies,  resulting  from  the  historical  conflict  with  economic
sectors  and  the  institutional  distinctions  of  their  policy  systems.  Note  that  the
comparative  lens  between  Brazil  and  Argentina  is  particularly  interesting  from  an
empirical point of view. First, as mentioned earlier, the agricultural sector has a major
importance in both countries' economies and politics. Second, family farming groups,
which are  the  most  relevant  sector  in  quantitative  terms and whose  production is
strategic for domestic consumption, have acquired major political resources over the
past decade. Third, both Brazil and Argentina adopted targeted-family farming policy
instruments  in  the  early  2000s  and  began  the  dismantling  processes  in  2015-2016.
Fourth,  these two countries engaged, in the late 2000s,  in an effort to promote the
regional diffusion of these policy instruments. Finally, despite the similar trajectories
of development, diffusion and the early steps in dismantling family farming policies in
the two countries, the causes and late evolution of dismantling are different in each
context. In Argentina the process started after general elections and an overt change in
the government’s political and economic orientation, while in Brazil it has been part of
a major crisis of the political system.
The Figure 1 summarizes the analytical framework.
 
Figure 1: Policy dismantling framework
Source: Bauer et al., 2012; Gürtler et al., 2019; Howlett, 2019.
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1.2. Data collection
17 The  empirical  data  of  this  article  was  mainly  provided  by  three  collective  studies
carried out in various countries by the Research Network "Public Policies and Rural
Development  in  Latin  America"  (PP-AL  Network)  between 2013  and 2018.  The  first
study adopted a common framework to analyze the development of family farming
policies in eleven countries. The second study, held in 2016, detailed the constraints of
these policies, particularly regarding instruments of promotion of organic farming and
agroecology (Sabourin, Le Coq, et al.,  2018). Between 2016 and 2018, the third study
analyzed the influence of Brazil and Argentina in the regional diffusion and transfer of
family farming policy instruments (Sabourin, Grisa, et al., 2020; Sabourin, Grisa, and
Lopez, 2018, Sabourin and Grisa, 2018). A brief update was conducted in 2018 (Grisa,
Sabourin,  & Le Coq, 2018) and in 2019,  after the election of far-right groups to the
presidency of Brazil and the expansion of the economic crisis in Argentina. 
18 The  aforementioned  studies  used  process-tracing  methodologies,  based  on  semi-
structured interviews with policymakers and social actors and on official documents.
For  the  purpose  of  this  article,  additional  primary  information  was  collected
specifically for the cases of Brazil and Argentina and a qualitative cross-case analysis,
focused  on  the  causes  and  processes  of  the  dismantling  of  family  farming  policy
instruments, was held. By shedding light on the trajectories of the development and
dismantling of  these policies,  their specific  content,  main actors and coalitions,  the
article shows that the causal mechanisms and processes proposed by Bauer et al. are
consistent  with  the  evidence  from  the  case  studies  and  further  elaborates  the
framework to facilitate future in-depth and regionally based analyses.
 
2. Emergence and consolidation of family farming
policies in Latin America
19 This section identifies a variety of policy instruments that have targeted family farming
across Latin America over time, including — but not limited to — the distinctive policies
in Brazil and Argentina. The emergence of these policies has been distinct according to
the country, in terms of time period, supporting coalitions and windows of opportunity
(Adib & Almada, 2017). Most of the policies reveal the role of rural social movements
which, at certain times, managed to form coalitions able to influence public decisions. 
20 The emergence of family farming policies in Latin America can be divided into three
broad generations (Sabourin et al., 2015). The first generation (1950s–1980s) was guided
by the goals of promoting access to land and developing the economic and technical
capacities  of  family  farmers  and  included  the  promotion  of  land  reforms  and,  to
varying degrees,  agricultural  credit  and technical  assistance.  Most  of  these  policies
were either interrupted or stunted by periods of military dictatorship. Alternatively, in
countries like Brazil, Uruguay, Peru and Bolivia, these goals were converted to policies
of colonization of public lands on the agricultural frontiers of the Pampas or Amazon
regions.  In  these  countries,  land-access  initiatives  were  supported  by  international
organizations (such as the Food and Agriculture Organization-FAO and the World Bank)
and  accepted  by  dictatorship  governments  as  they  were  intended  to  prevent
"communists" from advancing into the countryside. 
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21 The  second  generation  (1996–2000s  in  Brazil,  early  2000s  in  other  countries)
corresponds with a period of diversification of instruments targeting family farmers. In
general  terms,  a  common  portfolio  for  supporting  family  farming  comprised:  i)
registration  mechanisms  to  define  beneficiaries  (sometimes  legally  binding);  ii)
agricultural  credit  specifically  targeted to  family  farmers;  and iii)  capacity-building
programs  (basically,  rural  extension  and  support  for  local  organizations).  These
policies were commonly supported by progressive left-wing governments that invested
increasing amounts of public funds in family farming support (Alves & Rocha, 2010).
Paradoxically, the main difference between countries resided in the definition of the
"family  farming"  category,  which  varied  according  to  the  specificity  of  the  land
structure, the history of the peasantry and the type of social and political support that
the national government sought to preserve (Sabourin et al., 2015). 
22 It  is  worth  noting  that  public  support  for  family  farming  received  low  opposition
during the 2000s as the potential competitors for the public budget — the agribusiness
sector — benefited from the expansion of commodities’ international markets during
this  decade.  Moreover,  several  programs  relied  on  the  integration  of  a  productive
family farming elite with commodity value chains, a model that received the
endorsement of liberal governments. For instance, the National Program to Strengthen
Family  Agriculture  in  Brazil  (Pronaf)  provided  support  by  issuing  credit  to  family
producers  who  were  already  inserted  into  commodity  agri-food  chains  for  their
technological modernization (Aquino & Schneider, 2010). 
23 The  third  generation  (from  2005)  comprises  policy  instruments  addressing  global
development  challenges,  such as  food and nutrition security,  adaptation to  climate
change, sustainable or territorial development and global poverty alleviation. These
instruments are not explicitly focused on the family farming category; however, they
have  been  recognized  as  being  promising  for  the  empowerment  of  family  farmers
through the implementation of consultative bodies and compensation contracts, such
as payments for environmental services (Ezzine, Le Coq, 2017). They are particularly
relevant  for  diversifying  and  completing  family  farming  policy  portfolios  and  for
addressing adapted support to specific segments: the rural poor; the native, peasants’,
or fishers’ communities; women and youth, etc. (Sabourin & Grisa, 2019).
24 Table  1  summarizes  some  of  these  policy  instruments  established  in  Brazil  and
Argentina.  Their  evolution,  as  well  as  their  appropriation and advocacy by distinct
political and economic groups, will, over time, affect the constellation of the costs and
benefits  of  reinforcing  or  dismantling  them,  which  is  discussed  in  the  following
sections.
 
Table 1: Main policy instruments affecting family farming in Brazil and Argentina, by field of
intervention
 Brazil Argentina
1-  Generalist
agricultural  policy
instruments
-  Agrarian  reform  and  land
colonization by the Ministry of
Agriculture, 1962-1998.
-  Generalist  agriculture policy shaped
for  business  farming  by  Secretary  of
Agriculture  (mid-1980,  replaced  by
MINAGRI in 2008).
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2- Specific targeted
family  farming
policy instruments
-  Establishment  of  the  National
Program  Supporting  Family
Farming  (Pronaf),  including
agricultural  credit  specifically
targeted  at  family  farming  and  a
family  farming  national  register,
1995;
-  Establishment  of  distinct  programs:
Minifundio (Small Units), 1987; PPNEA
(Program  for  small  producers  of the
northeast);  Cambio  Rural  (Rural
Change),  Programa  Social
Agropecuario  (Agriculture  Social
Program), 1993;
 
-  Creation  of  the  Ministry  of
Agrarian Development,  focused on
family  farming  and  land  policies,
1999; 
-  PROINDER  (Rural  Initiatives
program), 1998;
 
-  Technical  assistance  and  rural
extension policy, 2004.
-  National  Family  Farming  Register,
2007;-  Secretariat  of  Rural
Development  and  Family  Farming,
2009;- Social Agricultural Monotribute,
2009.
3-  Sustainable
development  and
rural-territories
policy instruments
-  Support  for  the  development  of
rural  territories  (PRONAT  and
Citizenship  Territories  Program),
2004-2008;
-  National  Rural  Sustainable
Development  Program  (PROFEDER),
2011;
 
- Technical assistance and financial
support  for  the  development  of
agroecology  and  organic  farming
(PNAPO), 2012.
- PROINDER, second stage, 2009.
4-  Food  security
and  reduction  of
rural  poverty
policy instruments
-  Social  protection  combined with
public food purchases (Zero Hunger
Program,  National  Food  and
Nutritional  Security  Council,  Food
Acquisition  Program,  School
Feeding Program), 2003, 2009.
-  PROHUERTA  (Family  orchards
program), 1990;- Program of Provision
of  Running  Water,  Social  Help  and
Basic  Sanitation (PROPASA),  1999;-
National Food Security Plan, 2003.
Source: Sabourin, Samper & Sotomayor, 2015
 
3. Crisis and dismantling of family farming policies in
Brazil and Argentina
3.1. Strategies and stages
25 In Brazil  and Argentina,  a common feature of the policy dismantling process is  the
orientation of its early steps by diffuse and unnoticeable strategies. Even though, in
both countries,  the dismantling process subsequently reached an active and “credit
claimer” approach, the process began with dispersed institutional changes, which is
consistent with Bauer et al.’s  claims regarding the expected degree of resistance to
dismantling (Bauer et al., 2012). This observation also aligns with recent literature on
the weakening of democratic systems worldwide. Levitsky and Ziblat (2018) describe
how governmental efforts to subvert modern democracies are approved by legislative
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power and by the courts. There is no coup d’état or turning point: change is almost
invisible.  Keeping  in  mind  the  due  proportion  of  association  between  democratic
systems  and  specific  policies,  the  argument  refers  to  the  initial  invisibility  of  the
dismantling process for policies which are committed to basic rights.
26 This section discusses the sequencing of Bauer et al.’s categories of dismantling. Most
dismantling  processes  begin  with  discreet  strategies,  which are  usually  justified  by
economic  austerity  in  the  face  of  a  budget  crisis.  In  the  case  of  family  farming,
however,  the  dismantling  process  reached  an  active  approach  using  undemocratic
strategies based on the denial of the legitimacy – and even criminalization – of the
political opponents. This has been particularly apparent in the case of Brazil where the
dismantling process followed major changes in the politico-institutional system.
 
Brazil: from default to active dismantling
27 The first signs of the dismantling of family farming policy instruments in Brazil came
during the second mandate of Dilma Rousseff (2014–2016). Her administration made
ambiguous decisions about land reform, as it prioritized the titling of already allocated
land instead of allocating land to new beneficiaries (Sabourin, 2018). There was also a
reduction of funds, attempts to merge the Ministry of Agrarian Development (MDA)
and  the  Ministry  of  Social  Development  (MDS),  and  paralysis  of  the  new  National
Agency for Technical Assistance and Rural Extension (ANATER) (Niederle et al., 2019).
These  actions  resulted  from  the  weakening  of  parliamentary  support  for  the
government  in  the  congress,  the  prioritization  of  support  for  agribusiness1 in  the
context of economic recession, and a decrease in public resources for these policies.
Drawing  on  Bauer  et  al.’s  categories,  this  was  the  beginning  of  a  “dismantling  by
default”, which relates to the diminishing of financial or political resources. This kind
of strategy can, in principle, bypass political opposition for a long time, but certainly
not forever (Bauer et al., 2012).
28 Other important signs of dismantling included lawsuits against the rural movements,
including family farmer cooperatives. For example, in 2014, the conservative sectors in
the states of Paraná and São Paulo obtained a series of administrative-zeal measures
from  the  Public  Prosecutor's  Office  and  the  Brazilian  Federal  Court  of  Audit  that
concealed  a  mechanism  for  criminalizing  movements;  this  was  based  on  excessive
control and a literal interpretation of the contracts for public purchases of food coming
from family farmers (Hentz and Hespanhol, 2018). Thus, by the end of the first Rousseff
mandate, several cooperatives and associations that managed the Family Farming Food
Acquisition Program (PAA) contracts had their leaders convicted and imprisoned for
having delivered boxes of lettuce in place of cabbages for schools’ canteen supplies –
they were finally absolved in 2017. Also, the director of the National Supply Company
(CONAB) of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Supply (MAPA), responsible for
the PAA, was fired.
29 Rousseff was impeached by congress in 2016, a process led by a right-wing coalition
particularly aligned with conservative and ultraliberal ideas. Michel Temer took office
in  October  2016  and,  since  then,  the  country  has  witnessed  the  active  and  rapid
dismantling of family farming policies. The MDA was dissolved and its programs were
transferred to the Ministry of Social and Agrarian Development (MDSA), in accordance
with the proposal of researchers who affirmed that family farming should be assisted
by  social  rather  than  productive  policies  (Alves  &  Rocha,  2010).  According  to  this
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argument,  the  family  farming category included too  many types  of  non-productive
segments (indigenous communities, traditional peasant people, small fishermen, etc);
hence, productive support should be limited to farmers integrated into the agri-food
chains (Alves et al, 2010; Navarro & Pedroso, 2011). 
30 Subsequently, as a result of the inability of MDSA civil servants to manage agricultural
programs on the one hand and, on the other hand, the reactions of social movements,
the  former  MDA  secretariats  were  brought  together  in  a  single  entity,  the  Special
Secretariat for Family Agriculture and Agrarian Development (SEAD). Pronaf’s credit
lines had been maintained, but without technical assistance, and it ended up running
very slowly due to the suspension of the assigned budget. There was a call by interest
groups  supporting  this  government  that  these  credit  lines  should  further  benefit
middle-income and agribusiness farmers. The graphs of the evolution of the budgets
for  family  farming  instruments  and for  land-reform  actions  clearly  illustrate  the
decrease in resources (Figure 2).  On the other hand, instruments of support for the
development  of  rural  territories  became completely  paralyzed and the  land-reform
program that had just been revised was transferred to the Civil House as a means of
centralizing the control of its evolution. Thus, the process initially driven by a strategy
of arena-shifting was later replaced by an active dismantling.
 
Figure 2: Financial resources allocated to family farming and land reform policy instruments
between 2015 and 2018, BRL million
Source: Niederle et al., 2019
31 After the 2018 Bolsonaro election, the dismantling process was expanded to additional
sectors,  including environmental and education policies,  and pursued an even more
radical and open strategy. The SEAD was renamed Secretariat of Family Farming and
Cooperativism and subordinated to the Ministry of Agriculture (Decree 9667/2019), the
institution  historically  identified  with  the  interests  of  agribusiness sectors  and
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recognized as participating in political tensions with the former MDA. Furthermore,
most of the funds for family farming remained frozen by austerity measures and the
councils  for  the  design  and  monitoring  of  these  policies  were  extinguished  by
presidential decree, particularly the National Council of Food and Nutritional Security
(Decree  9759/2019).  Traditional  peoples  have  been  consistently  attacked  by
presidential  speeches,  which  accuse  them  of  blocking  development  activities  and
colluding with foreign actors at the expense of national sovereignty (Sauer et al., 2019).
Finally, land titling (to landless farmers and indigenous populations) was obstructed.
Regarding  the  indigenous  populations,  the  institutional  body  responsible  for
recognizing their lands and receiving their demands was initially transferred to the
Ministry  of  Agriculture,  which  was  blamed  for  hindering  these  policies’
implementation.
32 Therefore,  the  dismantling  process  has  exhibited  high visibility  in  recent  years,  as
politicians wish to pursue a clear and strong tactic. Brazilian far-right partisans are
ideologically  convinced that  dismantling is  the most appropriate solution and their
electoral  base,  which  is  partially  composed  of  conservative  groups  from  the
agribusiness sector, showcases a clear preference for dismantling. 
 
Argentina: an intertwined process of dismantling
33 The process of the dismantling of policy instruments showed certain ambiguities in the
case  of  Argentina.  The  Family  Farming  Law  enacted  in  2014  during  the  Cristina
Kirchner administration was not modified by the neoliberal orientation of the Macri
government which attained power in December 2015. A suspension of land evictions of
peasants with precarious access to land was extended to 2019 by the Legislative power.
Some programs were also maintained as a means of avoiding increasing conflicts and
preserving certain commitments at the international level.
34 However, and very quickly after the new government reached power, some relevant
changes were introduced in the institutionality related to family farming, implying a
process of arena-shifting with low visibility in terms of mainstream public opinion. The
former  Secretariat  of  Family  Agriculture  (under  the  Ministry  of  Agroindustry)  was
merged  with  the  Secretariat  of  Coordination  and  Territorial  Development.  Other
components of the institutional framework were retained, such as a council composed
of government officials and representatives of organizations (Consejo de la Agricultura
Familiar, Campesina y Indígena), but its internal composition changed, and the number of
meetings  diminished.  By  2018,  meetings  ultimately  ceased  and  were  replaced  by
decentralized contacts with selected groups. In addition, a specific instance of public-
private dialogue concerning agrarian conflicts was abandoned (Nogueira et al., 2017;
Montón, 2018). 
35 A  different  kind  of  strategy  was  pursued  through  the  changes  instituted  in  the
mechanisms  for  the  implementation  of  certain  policy  instruments.  For  instance,
registration  in  the  National  Registry  of  Family  Farmers  (RENAF)  enables  access  to
government programs; in 2017, the need for a new registration process was announced.
Organizations claimed that they were excluded as registration entities and that new
parameters  were  established,  leading  to  a  reduction  in  the  number  of  registrants
(Montón, 2018; Vigil, 2019). In the case of the Monotributo Social Agropecuario (MSA), a
new form of operation was introduced by the government; again, the consequence was
an abrupt reduction in the number of farmers enrolled in the system. MSA was initially
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conceived as a specific tax system that gives farmers the possibility of issuing invoices
and facilitates  their  access  to  health  services  and social  security.  The  government,
through  the  Ministry  of  Agroindustry,  covered  part  of  the  individual  contribution
needed for sanitary insurance payment. In 2018, beneficiaries were required to update
their registration within 40 days. Additionally, MSA was transferred to the Ministry of
Social  Development  and  Agroindustry  ceased  its  contributions  to  beneficiaries’
insurance.  Thus,  both  instruments  were  maintained  but  their  effective  scope  was
diminished.
36 At  the  same  time,  other  measures  could  be  interpreted  as  dismantling  by  arena-
shifting. New programs oriented to family farmers and those remaining from previous
years were reoriented towards more capitalized segments,  assisted on an individual
basis  (Bertoni  and  Soverna,  2018;  Vigil,  2019).  Support  for  family  producers’
organizations  was  reduced  or  ceased,  affecting  the  smallest  ones  (Vigil,  2019).  In
addition,  an  entrepreneurial  view,  focused  on  productive  and  commercial  issues,
displaced  the  emphasis  on  access  to  rights  that  dominated  the  2012-2015  period
(Bertoni & Soverna, 2018; Nogueira et al., 2017). 
37 This  bias  can  also  be  observed  in  the  requisites  for  accessing  certain  instruments.
Legislation that began to be promoted during the second mandate of Cristina Kirchner,
such  as  a  norm  creating  a  family  farming  seal,  was  taken  up  by  the  Macri
administration.  However,  the  criteria  adopted  imply  strong  barriers  for  small,  less
capitalized family farmers if there is no public support to facilitate compliance2. 
38 Along  with  these  policy  measures,  other  dismantling  mechanisms  could  be  subtle,
implying a dismantling by default. For instance, the budget allocated to programs was
not updated according to inflation (which reached more than 20% in 2017 and nearly
50% in 2018). Changes of officials in charge of executive areas at national and provincial
levels paralyzed or postponed actions; in some cases, there were complaints about their
lack of experience and their designation by partisan policy criteria (Vigil, 2019).
39 At the same time, a more overt process of active dismantling took place through the
drastic reduction in the number of technicians assisting family farmers. Between 2016
and 2018, about 850 workers — nearly 60% of the total — were fired and some areas
were  left  with  virtually  no  technical  assistance  (Rang  et  al., 2018).  Organizations
denounced the budget reductions to programs oriented to the sector (Montón, 2018). In
practice,  technicians’  field  work  was  minimized,  or  even  paralyzed,  affecting
subsistence producers to a great extent (Vigil, 2019). The absence of further regulation
concerning the Family Farming Law enacted in 2014 facilitated this situation, an issue
that will be taken up later. 
40 A proxy of the family farming policies’ budget evolution is provided in Figure 3, which
includes the programs carried out by the Ministry of Agroindustry financed by external
credit  and  those  under  the  framework  of  the  National  Institute  of  Agricultural
Technology (INTA).  The figure shows that  2018 saw the most striking cut in funds;
however, the ProHuerta program, which is oriented to poverty alleviation in urban and
rural areas, was prioritized.
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Figure 3: Argentina. Evolution of funds oriented to family farming
Funds in pesos argentinos were converted to dollars at the exchange rate in the beginning of each
year. The budget assigned at the end of each year was considered except for 2018, when the assigned
funds were considered.
Source: Authors, based on data provided by DIPROSE (Ministry of Agroindustry) and INTA
41 Considering the overall process, Nogueira et al. (2017) refer to an emptying of policies
related  to  family  farming  behind  the  maintenance  of  an  apparent  institutionality.
Bertoni and Soverna (2018) speak of a process of de-institutionalization. Beyond this
characterization, the regressive evolution of the policy instruments oriented to family
farming in Argentina should be evaluated in consideration of the whole picture: taxes
on  agricultural  exports  (mainly  soybeans)  were  reduced,  the  exchange  rate  was
released and a marked devaluation of the Argentine currency took place (of about 400
percent between 10/12/15 and 28/12/18). All these measures benefited export-oriented
agribusiness  while  increasing  agricultural  input  costs  for  farmers  oriented  to  the
domestic market. In addition, the orientation of the Macri administration was clearly
expressed through the appointment of a representative of Sociedad Rural Argentina —
the  organization  that  represents  the  nation’s  big  landowners  —  as  Minister  of
Agroindustry in 2017. 
 
Common stages in the process of policy dismantling
42 Drawing on the previous cases, the process of dismantling in Brazil and Argentina can
be summarized in three main stages, although these are not always linear or mutually
exclusive.  First,  the  maintenance  of  institutions  was  followed by  changes  in  policy
content, or targeted beneficiaries. In the initial steps, preventing social protests and
resistance may be a common strategy. This process is characterized by the preservation
of  instruments,  but  also  by  adjustments  in  the  mandate,  position,  or  name  of  the
responsible  institutions.  The  reduction of  funds,  human resources  and institutional
strength  is  gradual,  or  even  discreet.  This  is  expected,  for  instance,  to  preserve
economic  interests  by  maintaining  farmers  as  providers  or  buyers,  or  even  by
transferring  the  benefits  that  were  originally  assigned  to  family  farmers  to
entrepreneurs, according to the “arena-shifting” modality. This was the decision made
by  the  Macri  administration  in  Argentina  where  the  institutional  framework  was
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gradually downgraded. In Brazil, the Temer administration followed a similar path by
first merging the two social and rural development ministries (MDA and MDS). 
43 Second, policy dismantling relied on the severe contraction of both institutions and
resources. In Argentina, the most striking features have been the reductions in field
technicians,  in  operational  resources  to  assist  family  producers  and  in  transferred
credits or subsidies. In Brazil, the Temer administration entrusted the management of
the family farming and land-reform portfolio to Solidarity, a union competing with the
National  Confederation of  Agricultural  Workers (Contag)  and the Landless Workers'
Movement (MST), the social basis of the former MDA. However, this small union had
neither human resources nor social support and so the initiative failed. The alternative
was to place the new Secretary of Family Agriculture close to the central power in
order to facilitate both political and judicial control of the category. In this context,
programs  such  as  Pronaf,  which  benefited  from  the  interest  of  some  agribusiness
groups,  was  maintained,  although  with  fewer  resources, while  programs  based  on
alternative approaches (territorial  development,  support for traditional populations,
land reform, indigenous lands) were paralyzed. 
44 The third and final stage of policy dismantling is the suppression of institutionality and
the criminalization of rural movements. These strategies rely on the straightforward
extinction of family farming policies and on judicial control of reactions to dismantling.
This stage corresponds to active dismantling and is currently underway in Brazil, but
also in other Latin American countries such as Paraguay and Nicaragua (Freguin-Gresh
and Perez, 2018; Friggeri, 2017).
45 The case studies provide evidence that policy dismantling is more often an incremental
process of policy change. Although there are cases of sudden ruptures, a process of
sequential stages of growing intensity is more likely to happen. Even in Brazil, where a
major political shift and a process of institutional fragilization took place after the 2016
presidential  impeachment,  dismantling started imperceptibly,  initially  led by minor
institutional changes.
 
3.2. Causes of dismantling
46 The factors leading to dismantling include structural conditions and contextual and
institutional  constraints  regarding  the  features  of  the  political  system.  Brazil  and
Argentina share several features regarding the macro-level determinants, the politics
of the rural sector and the process of development of family farming policy portfolios.
A slower pace of economic growth, coupled with a decrease in the dividends coming
from agricultural exports, affected state incomes and weakened the ruling coalitions,
which  were  composed  of  left-wing  parties.  The  subsequent  shift  in  the  political
orientation of governments — which, in the case of Brazil, has been accompanied by a
substantial process of change in the institutional system — was the turning point that
affected  the  dismantling  of  family  farming  policies.  Finally,  support  for  the  family
farming category during the 2000s lacked further institutional and political weight in
terms of representing a countervailing power to the agribusiness commodities-export
sector.
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Structural and contextual factors
47 Both Brazil and Argentina experienced economic growth during the 2000s, which was
partially  sustained  by  the  promotion  of  internal  consumption  and  the  export  of
primary  products,  particularly  to  Chinese  markets.  This  economic  model  was
accompanied by a major governmental effort to distribute dividends in order to reduce
poverty and social inequality — an effort that was maintained after the 2008 financial
crisis as growth characterized Brazil  and other countries in the global South, while
economies of the global North faced recession. Nevertheless, the distribution of income
and wealth remained uneven, especially in rural areas, and these countries’ economies
remained  unstable  in  the  international  markets  (Milhorance,  2018;  Sabourin  et  al.,
2015). 
48 Furthermore, a few years after the global financial and economic crisis, the effects of
recession also hit commodities export-oriented countries such as Brazil and Argentina.
This  initially  resulted  in  budget  cuts  at  the  national  level,  which  were  applied  in
particular to policies linked to minority groups such as indigenous peoples, peasants’
groups and landless farmers. Other Latin American countries followed a similar path,
namely Bolivia, Uruguay, Costa Rica and Nicaragua (Sabourin and Grisa, 2018). Some
scholars  believe  that,  in  the  early  2010s,  Brazil,  Argentina  and  other  emerging
countries closed the expansion cycle that was initiated in the 2000s (Salama, 2014).
49 Along  with  the  economic  crisis,  these  countries  faced  political  instability  and
governmental shifts. In Brazil, these factors led to the impeachment of the Workers’
Party president,  Dilma Rousseff,  in 2016. The progressive left-wing government was
replaced by conservative and ultraliberal political groups, reaching a higher degree of
radicalization after the election of the far-right candidate, Jair Bolsonaro, in 2018. In
Argentina, the progressive character of the Kirchner administrations, which ruled the
country  between  2003  and  2015,  was  replaced  by  the  neoliberal  administration  of
Mauricio  Macri  who promoted several  austerity  policies.  These governmental  shifts
reinforced  economic  and  political  groups  opposed  to  the  development  of  family
farming,  which  created  an  increasingly  conflictive,  or  de-legitimizing,  environment
and led to the reduction of public investment in the sector. This process contributed to
the dismantling of the family farming policy portfolio that was beginning not only in
Brazil  and Argentina, but also in other Latin American countries (Grisa et al.,  2018;
Vergara-Camus and Kay, 2017). 
50 The external  drivers  of  this  dismantling  process  include  the  global  wave  currently
contesting  social  democratic  models  and  multilateralism  (Levitsky  &  Ziblatt,  2018),
which has reached Latin America and particularly Brazil. This wave paved the way to
challenging the basis of social democracy, as well as the principles inherent in family
farming policies,  such as social participation in public policies, productive inclusion
and  protection  of  minority  groups.  In  parallel,  there  has  been  a  fragmentation  of
traditional  social  movements  in  Latin  America,  particularly  trade  unions,  national
federations and grassroots movements (Fachin, 2010). 
51 In some countries, the co-opting of popular leaders to assume responsibilities in left-
wing  governments  affected  their  leadership,  or  weakened  their  vigilance,  and
consequently reinforced the sector’s political fragmentation. In Brazil, a distinction can
be made between the so-called “new social movements” (environmentalists, indigenous
groups and agroecologists) (Touraine, 1978) on the one side, which are less aligned with
The Dismantling of Family Farming Policies in Brazil and Argentina
International Review of Public Policy, 2:1 | 2020
15
governmental  efforts,  and  traditional  unions  on  the  other  side  (Gohn,  2011).  The
former have managed to mobilize broader sectors in society; however, they have more
recently  faced  attacks,  including  criminalization  by  the  judiciary  power  (Sauer  &
Mézsáros,  2017).  In  Argentina,  together  with  the  constitution  and  the  legal
formalization of the Federation of Family Farming Organizations (Fonaf) in 2011, other
alternative initiatives led by landless producers, peasants and members of indigenous
communities have emerged which questioned the “close ties” between Fonaf and the
national government (Nogueira et al., 2017).
52 Nevertheless, the final, decisive structural factor in the dismantling process is the lack
of rupture with the dominant economic model that drove the main agricultural policy
strategies. Even during progressive administrations, the support of governments and
banks  that  was  given  to  the  agribusiness  commodities-export  sector  remained
untouched. Both in Brazil and Argentina, income redistribution to family and peasant
farmers,  as  well  as  to  other  traditional  peoples  and  communities,  was  marginal,
sometimes corporatist,  and related to specific social bases (Sabourin, 2018; Vergara-
Camus and Kay 2017). In general terms, the governments’ initial goal was to use the
positive trade balance of commodity exports to finance social compensatory or pro-
family farming policies. This was feasible during the early 2000s, given the high prices
of  agricultural  commodities  and  the  tacit  agreement  between  states  and  the
agribusiness  sector;  but  it  was  a  compromise  that  ultimately  changed  after  the
economic crisis. 
53 As stated by Bauer et al. (2012), if there is little opposition, dismantling can be pursued
to attack the core of a policy directly. Power relations changed in the mid-2010s and
governmental support for family farming groups was no longer a priority. As discussed,
the dismantling process was gradual, beginning with discreet budget cuts, justified by
the economic crisis,  until  reaching an active and open political  strategy.  Therefore,
depending on the power relations between beneficiaries, or between sectors, as well as
on the capacity of government or affiliated media to sway public opinion, dismantling
may not be "inherently unpopular" or "extremely treacherous" (Pierson, 1994).
 
Institutional constraints and opportunities
54 In  addition  to  the  structural  factors,  the  weight  of  the  institutional  constraints
confronting policymakers should be considered. These include not only those aspects
related to the political system’s features, but also the perception of costs and benefits,
which  varies  according  to  the  types  of  policies  being  considered.  The  greater  the
number and power of veto players, the lower the probability that an active dismantling
strategy will be used, or that it will succeed (Bauer et al., 2012). For instance, Bauer et
al.  refer to the features of  the US polity — namely legalism, distributed power and
many  checks  and  balances  —  that  constrain  dismantling  and  prevent  “unilateral
strategies.” Indeed, the more that politicians need to seek consent from institutional,
party, or other societal actors, the more costly the process becomes. Therefore, the
institutional — even constitutional — context influences not only the mode, but also
the concrete target, of policy dismantling (Bauer et al., 2012). 
55 Overall,  both  Brazil  and  Argentina  have  faced  institutional  drawbacks,  along  with
political and economic crisis. A detailed analysis of the governmental shifts in these
countries is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, it is worth highlighting some
of their trends: the fragilization of the progressive governments in place; the active
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role of media groups largely represented by conservative actors; the denunciations of
left-wing leaders’ corruption (Fuser, 2018). In Brazil, the process of dismantling went
through  a  deeper  process  as  it  resulted  from  the  fragilization  of  its  political
institutions.  There  has  been  a  growing  tension  between  the  fragmented  political
system,  which  is  characterized  by  a  multi-party  coalition  presidentialism
(presidencialismo de coalizão), and the legal system which has progressively acquired the
prerogative of regulating political debate. All this has led to the politicization of legal
institutions and the judicialization of national politics (Vilhena, 2018). 
56 Neither public opinion, nor the perception of the distribution of the costs and benefits
of  dismantling,  are  objective;  they  are  significantly  affected  by  the  institutional
structures that obtain a certain momentum in a political system. Moreover, as Bauer et
al. (2012) discuss, the features of each policy matter. According to the authors, the costs
to  be  imposed on vulnerable  (and deserving)  beneficiaries  when dismantling  social
policies may be concentrated, while the benefits are diffused across the rest of society.
This particular feature would exert a powerful and constraining influence on the way
in which such policies are dismantled. In other words, the dismantling of this kind of
policy would commonly start by way of more discreet paths. 
57 Nevertheless, the preferences of the potentially affected political actors differ and the
perception of the costs and benefits varies greatly depending on the historical meaning
that a certain group of policies acquires. In Latin America in general, and particularly
in Brazil, family farming policies were built largely thanks to the active role of social
rural  movements  and  their  ability  to  form  coalitions  with  governmental  actors  in
specific  periods.  These  policies  were  built  on  social  struggles  and  on  the
institutionalization  of  a  dual  system  that  promoted  concurrently  distinct  (and
sometimes  divergent)  rural-development  models  (Milhorance,  2018).  This  led  to
tensions  and  contradictions  between  different  state  agencies,  which  remained
unresolved  and  ultimately  left  space  for  the  dismantling  of  actions  when  new
administrations reached power.
58 An additional institutional factor observed in Brazil is the Bolsonaro administration’s
inclination  to  govern  using  presidential  decrees.  This  leaves  the congress  and  the
constitutional court with the decision of whether to accept or refuse some of the daily
policy  options  and  reinforces  the  gradual  judicialization  process  mentioned  above
(Vilhena, 2018). The role of Brazil’s Constitution in protecting basic social rights was
also questioned when congress approved a constitutional amendment that created a
new fiscal regime for reducing health and education spending (95/2016). In the same
way,  although  the  right  to  adequate  food  was  approved  as  constitutional  in  2010
(amendment 64/2010), there is no consensus in Brazil regarding the relation of this
right to family farming policies. 
59 Apart from the features of  each political  system, the specific  institutionality in the
design  of  family  farming  policy  portfolios  may  influence  their  resilience;  in  other
words, it may affect their ability to resist opposition over the medium-to-long term. In
Brazil, this institutionality relied on the federal government (ministerial guidelines),
which  is  also  the  main  source  of  funds  used  to  implement  them.  Rousseff’s
impeachment in 2016 weakened these institutions at the national level.  The lack of
sufficiently powerful veto players in subnational institutions and in the (predominantly
conservative)  congress  reduces prospects  for  constraining  their  dismantling.  In
Argentina, despite the increase in funds devoted to family farming policies during the
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2000s, there was a frequent reliance on international subsidies or loans (Sabourin et al.,
2015; Grisa et al., 2018). In this country, a family farming law was enacted in 2014 (Law
27.118/2014), but it did not include an allocation of specific funds to the sector; to be in
effective operation, a law must be accompanied by a legal measure that establishes the
way by which the recognized rights are exercised. 
60 If the dismantling process began with the reduction of funds in the context of economic
crisis,  it  was later shaped by voluntary,  intentional  dismantling as a portion of  the
political groups that took office actually perceived family farming policies not only to
be ineffective but also to be on the opposite side of their preferences. The cost of such a
process  is  perceived  as  limited  as  a  common  issue  in  Latin  America  is  the  lack  of
political weight of family farmers in terms of organizations and alliances among/with
the broader society when facing agribusiness-sector resources and power (Sabourin,
Sotomayor and Samper, 2015). 
61 Therefore, the case of family farming policies in Argentina and Brazil aligns with Bauer
et  al.’s  findings  regarding  the  weight  of  political  and  structural  factors  in  policy
dismantling, particularly in political systems marked by institutional fragilities and by
veto players who are limited in number (and in power).  However, the results differ
from the authors’ theoretical expectations regarding the “type” of policies. Evidence in
Brazil and Argentina shows that perception of the costs and benefits of dismantling
varies  across  jurisdictions  —  and  not  only  across  policy  “types”  or  “sectors”.  This
relates to the features of the political systems and to the socio-historical meaning of
each  policy  portfolio  in  this  system,  their  recognition  in  public  opinion  and  in
dominant  coalitions.  Finally,  the  relevance  of  institutional  constraints  may  also  be
discussed  within  the  broader  context  of  the  increasing  fragilization  of  democratic
institutions. As stated by several constitutionalists, the system of checks and balances
is  key;  however,  this  system is  not sufficient to prevent attacks against  democratic
institutions, as their resilience also relies on “informal” norms or, in other words, on
both society’s  and politicians’  commitment to these institutions (Levitsky & Ziblatt,
2018; Vilhena, 2018). In this context, the mobilization of social movements and their
impact  on  national  and international  public  opinion are  the  remaining  options  for
resistance.
 
4. Perspectives and a future research agenda:
reactions and resistance
62 The  framework  developed  by  Bauer  et  al.  (2012)  comprised  the  discussion  of  the
outputs  in  terms  of  policy  retraction  (density  and  intensity)  resulting  from  policy
dismantling. Yet studies regarding not only the outcomes of this process, but also the
reactions to it,  are still  underdeveloped.  Although this issue needs a specific  study,
some general trends and points for defining a future research agenda are sketched out
below. 
63 It  is  important  to  highlight  that  reactions  have  not  been  homogeneous,  given  the
diversity of resistance movements at the national level and the existence of distinct loci
of  social,  land  and  socio-environmental  conflicts.  Despite  this  heterogeneity,  three
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main  trends  were  observed  and  these  deserve  further  theorization  and  empirical
analysis:
Bureaucratic adaptation:  in some cases,  there is a relatively passive adaptation of civil
servants and staff involved in the implementation of policies being dismantled. This also
applies to the portion of social movements and trade unions supposedly interested in the
maintenance of certain policies. This was the case with Contag, the main representative of
family farming in Brazil, which preferred to negotiate with the Temer Government in order
to maintain the specific credit allowance allotted to family farming. 
Active and passive social resistance:  Active resistance may take several forms, ranging
from conflicts in the countryside to long-term mobilization processes. The major campaigns
are commonly organized by groups historically  involved in social  struggles (such as  the
landless, traditional communities and peasant movements) and comprise the protection of
basic rights. This kind of resistance may involve strategies to gain public visibility and the
forging  of  alliances  with  urban  actors.  In  Argentina,  several  entities  have  gathered  to
promote joint actions; organizations such as the Union of Land Workers (UTT) carried out
several "verdurazos" in main cities (the selling of groceries at very affordable prices) as a
form  of  protest.  In  Brazil,  large  free  meals  prepared  with  agroecological  products  (“
banquetaços”) were organized in public spaces in 2019 as a means of attracting attention to
the extinction of the National Council on Food Security. Maintaining political interaction is
an additional passive-resistance strategy. In Brazil, despite the extinction of the territorial
citizenship  program,  several  councils  continue  to  meet  and  discuss  policy  decisions
informally at the state or municipal level, or with the support of the Federated States, as in
the Northeast region (Milhorance, Sabourin and Mendes, 2019).
Label  change  by  international/national  organizations:  Relabeling  family  farming
projects  as  a  means  of  addressing  global  challenges is  an  additional  reaction  to  policy
dismantling.  No  longer  able  to  fund  family  farming  projects  in  collaboration  with
conservative or neoliberal governments, international cooperation agencies, such as IFAD,
IICA and UNDP,  began to  raise  funds  for  “climate-change adaptation,”  support  of  “low-
income  rural  populations,”  promotion  of  “regional  development”  and  “technological
innovation” as a pretext for maintaining their technical and financial support to this group.
For  instance,  FIDA-Mercosur,  anticipating  the  crisis,  decided to  transfer  an institutional
strengthening and training project for the Confederation of Family Producers' Organizations
of the Mercosur countries to its Rome-based office. 
64 Working in the same direction,  but  at  a  national  level,  civil  servants  committed to
family farming have tried to develop solutions to circumvent internal opposition, such
as  employing  resources  assigned  to  technological  projects  to  support  broader
objectives related to family farming and to maintaining their presence at the territorial
level. 
65 Another type of resistance came from the Latin American regional-integration bodies,
Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR)
and, more particularly, the Community of States of Latin America and the Caribbean
(CELAC),  which  established  a  Ministerial  Meeting  on  Family  Agriculture  and  Rural
Development. The latter reinforced its commitment to support the Plan of Action for
Family  Agriculture  in  El  Salvador  in  December  2017  (Declaración  Ministerial  de  la
CELAC sobre Agricultura Familiar, 2017).
 
• 
• 
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Conclusion
66 Family  farming policies  developed significantly  in  Latin  America  between 1995 and
2015, often promoted by rural social movements. Despite their results in terms of the
promotion  of  food  and  nutritional  security  and  productive  and  social  inclusion,  a
process of dismantling has recently taken place. This paper has analyzed the causes and
mechanisms of this process and provided elements to answer the question of why these
relatively  new  and  socially  oriented  policies  have  been  so  quickly  and  smoothly
dismantled. Several structural, contextual and institutional factors were presented.
67 First, the article discussed the lack of rupture within the dominant agricultural policy
model  which  is  based  on  the  allocation  of  resources  primarily  to  the  commodity
export-oriented agribusiness.  Family farming policies  benefited from an increase in
political  legitimacy and funds during the  2000s  and early  2010s;  however,  this  was
possible only as far as they were able to reduce social upheaval, or did not compete
with  the  interests  of  national  agrarian  capitalism  (Sabourin,  2018).  Once  opposing
coalitions took office in both Brazil and Argentina, these policies lost importance in
government  and  in  parliament.  Other  factors  included  the  global  financial  and
economic crises, which contributed to the deepening of political instability in Brazil
and Argentina. It is worth highlighting that, in both countries, the dismantling process
occurred in a context of political changes that, in the case of Brazil, were also linked to
the  extranational  interests  of  international  financial  capitalism,  particularly  land-
grabbing (Sauer et al., 2019). Finally, the dismantling of family farming policies — and
other policies as  well  — goes hand-in-hand with the global  wave of  fragilization of
democratic institutions and the arrival in power of right-wing conservative groups.
68 Although the structural  and contextual  factors are more relevant in explaining the
causes of the dismantling process, its speed and degree were related in particular to
institutional fragilities in policy design and to the limited number (and power) of veto
players in both countries.  Therefore, although dismantling first began with discreet
strategies  such as default  dismantling,  particularly justified by budget cuts  and the
economic crisis, they quickly acquired visible and active features. Lastly, the results of
this study differ in certain terms from Bauer et al.’s framework as the perception of the
costs and benefits of dismantling varies according to the socio-historical and political
meaning of each group of policies.
69 The results call for a more detailed analytical framework of the causes, modalities and
stages of policy dismantling to facilitate future in-depth and regionally based analyses.
The notion of resilience in the design of policy portfolios may also add to this literature
and deserves further research. Moreover, combining the theoretical framework with
traditional policy-change theories (institutionalism, internationalization), democracy-
regression  theories  and  resistance  strategies  (reshaping,  bypassing  and  overt  and
passive resistance) seems promising.
70 In  terms  of  policy  proposals,  this  study  shows  that  it  is  strategic to  overcome  the
corporatism of certain unions, to expand and strengthen coalitions of family farming
with urban movements, such as environmentalists or those promoting ecology, food
and nutrition security, education and health, and — in particular — to develop alliances
with consumers willing to support family production of quality and healthy food. These
kinds of policies can be considered reformist in the sense that they aim to improve
current situations without fundamentally altering existing structures (Vergara & Kay,
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2017).  Nonetheless,  in  the  present  scenario,  they  seem  important  for  supporting
strategic actors in the rural sector and sustaining their connections with other sectors.
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NOTES
1. The Minister of Agriculture was the former President of Brazil’s Confederation of Agribusiness,
the main representation body for large agricultural companies
2. For instance, good production practices and traceability of products must be certified. The
application to obtain the seal  must specify the production process,  who is  involved,  and the
volume produced (Resol. 330/17).
ABSTRACTS
This article examines the recent processes of dismantling public policies oriented to promote or
regulate family farming in Latin America. It addresses two main questions: How and why were
these policies  dismantled? Drawing on Bauer et  al.’s  (2012)  analytical  framework,  the article
examines  the  modalities  and  stages  of  the  process  of  dismantling  family  farming  policy
instruments in Brazil and Argentina. Likewise, it analyzes the process’s causes by delving into
structural, contextual and institutional factors. It adopts this framework, originally developed
for social policies in Europe, to analyze rural policies in Latin America. From a theoretical point
of  view,  the  study  suggests  the  importance  of  analyzing  the  resilience  of  policies  and  the
The Dismantling of Family Farming Policies in Brazil and Argentina
International Review of Public Policy, 2:1 | 2020
24
mechanisms and strategies of resistance to governmental shifts as these affect the degree and
direction that the process of dismantling may take.
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